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FATALISM: LOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL 
Alicia Finch and Ted A. Warfield 
The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is 
incompatible with libertarian freedom. The theological fatalist holds that the 
combination of God's past beliefs with His essential omniscience is incompati-
ble with libertarian freedom. There is an ongoing dispute over the relation 
between these two kinds of fatalism: some philosophers believe that the prob-
lems are equivalent while others believe that the theological problem is more 
difficult. We offer a diagnosis of this dispute showing that one's view of the 
modal status of God's existence and God's rdation to free creatures should 
determine one's position on the relation between the two fatalisms. 
The problem of logical fatalism is generated by arguments purporting to 
show that, for example, 
(1) Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
is incompatible with 
(2) It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 
2000 AD.! 
Similarly, the problem of theological fatalism is generated by arguments 
purporting to show that, to use the same example, (1) is incompatible 
with 
(3) God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD.2 
There is a long-running controversy over the relation between these 
two problems. On one side of the controversy are those philosophers 
who contend that the two problems are equivalent, that the theological 
problem is merely an alternative presentation of the logical problem. 
Alvin Planting a is one advocate of this view. Others include, for exam-
ple, William Lane Craig who claims that "theological fatalism is really 
just a variation of logical fatalism", and Richard Taylor who claims that 
the theological components of a theological argument for fatalism "add 
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nothing to the force of the argument" (though, he adds, they may help to 
"convey the reasoning more easily to the unphilosophical 
imagination").3 On the other side of the controversy (and this, so far as 
we can tell, is the side on which the majority opinion lies) are those who 
hold that theological fatalism is a more difficult problem for proponents 
of freedom than the logical problem. Linda Zagzebski, for example, says 
that "the threat of logical fatalism is weaker than the threat of theologi-
cal fatalism" and Willam Hasker and Nelson Pike agree.4 
We think that by understanding both the problem of logical fatalism 
and the problem of theological fatalism as problems concerning the logi-
cal consistency of the (representative) propositions, we are in a position 
to make some progress towards a resolution of this controversy. In par-
ticular, we think that understanding both problems this way allows us 
not only to make a more accurate assessment of the relative difficulties 
of the two problems but also to diagnose the widespread disagreement 
over the relative levels of difficulty of the two problems. 
Let's begin with a simple point. (3) implies (2) and so a demonstration of 
the consistency of (3) and (1), that is, a solution to the problem of theological 
fatalism, would therefore demonstrate the compatibility of (2) and (1) and 
would therefore solve the problem of logical fatalism. Similarly, but more 
weakly, an argument showing that (3) and (1) are plausibly consistent 
would, because (3) implies (2), show that (2) and (1) are at least plausibly 
consistent. It is presumably for this reason that no one, to our knowledge, 
has claimed that the problem of logical fatalism is a more difficult problem 
than the problem of theological fatalism. But is the theological problem 
more difficult than the logical problem or are the two problems equivalent? 
On our way of understanding these problems, this question is most easi-
ly answered by answering this question: Does (2) imply (3)? If (2) does 
imply (3) then the consistency of (2) and (1) implies the consistency of (3) 
and (1) and so (since, as we've already seen, the consistency of (3) and (1) 
implies the consistency of (2) and (1)) the theological and logical problems 
are equivalent. On the other hand, if (2) does not imply (3) then it is clear 
that the theological problem is formally stronger than the logical problem. 
So, we must ask, does (2) imply (3) or doesn't it? It might initially 
appear that the correct answer to this question is an emphatic "no". For 
consider a world in which (2) is true but in which God does not exist. 
Since God does not exist in this world, it is not the case that God has 
beliefs and so (3) is false. So it seems clear that (2) does not imply (3) 
which, if correct, shows that the problem of theological fatalism is a for-
mally stronger problem than the problem of logical fatalism. 
Despite this attractive argument for the thesis that the theological problem 
is formally stronger than the logical problem, however, the issue is not so 
easily resolved. Many (if not all) of the theists who maintain that the prob-
lems of logical and theological fatalism are equivalent would reject the above 
line of reasoning for the claim that (2) does not imply (3). According to at 
least many of these theists, God exists in all possible worlds. If this is correct, 
of course, there is no possible world in which (2) is true and in which God 
does not exist. Indeed, if God does exist in all possible worlds, then any 
world in which (2) is true is a world in which God exists and, owing to His 
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essential omniscience, knows in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD. That is, if God exists necessarily, (2) does imply (3) 
and therefore the logical and theological fatalism problems are equivalent. 
It is important to notice that one needn't accept that God exists neces-
sarily in order to be committed to (2)'s implying (3). All that one needs 
to accept to be committed to (2)'s implying (3) is that God exists in every 
world in which Plantinga exists (more generally: that God exists in every 
world in which free creatures exist; perhaps freedom is God's and God's 
alone to give). One can accept this proposition while consistently hold-
ing that God's existence is metaphysically contingent. But one who 
accepts this proposition is committed to the view that (2) implies (3) and 
therefore to the equivalence of theological and logical fatalism. 
The question of whether (2) implies (3), and with it the question of 
whether or not the problems of logical and theological fatalism are equiv-
alent, then, seems to depend on further questions about the nature of 
God and His relation to free creatures. We therefore offer the following 
diagnosis of the disagreement over the relative difficulties of the prob-
lems of logical and theological fatalism. Philosophers like Craig, Taylor, 
and Plantinga who accept that the logical and theological problems are 
equivalent must also accept at least that free creatures exist only in 
worlds in which God exists (perhaps accepting, as Plantinga explicitly 
does, that God exists necessarily).5 Those like Zagzebski, Hasker and 
Pike, however, who deny that the fatalism problems are equivalent, must 
deny that God exists in all worlds in which free creatures exist and must 
of course deny that God exists necessarily.6 The disagreement among 
these philosophers over the relative difficulty of the two fatalism prob-
lems thus reduces to more fundamental disagreements over these issues 
concerning God's existence and relation to free creatures. 
We have argued that the question of whether or not theological fatal-
ism is a harder problem than logical fatalism reduces to more funda-
mental issues about God's existence and relation to free creatures. We 
have not, however, considered the primary reason that those philoso-
phers who think that the theological problem is more difficult have 
offered on behalf of their position. These philosophers claim that an 
inspection of the standard arguments for theological and logical fatalism 
reveals that the theological problem is the more difficult of the two.7 We 
will now examine this line of reasoning and show that it in no way 
threatens the cogency of our diagnosis of the fatalism controversy. 
Consider the following initially plausible standard argument for theo-
logical fatalism:8 
AN ARGUMENT FOR THEOLOGICAL FATALISM 
TPl. Plantinga has no choice about the fact that God knew in 50 AD 
that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
TP2. Necessarily, if God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb 
Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD then Plantinga will climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
TCl. So, Plantinga has no choice about climbing Mount Rushmore in 
2000 AD. 
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The first premise of this argument is intuitively supported by the claim 
that God's past beliefs are a part of the fixed past and that there is noth-
ing that Plantinga can do to alter the fixed past. The argument's second 
premise is a clear necessary truth and the conclusion seems to follow 
from the premises of the argument by the plausibly valid rule of infer-
ence asserting that if an agent has no choice about a proposition then that 
agent has no choice about any logical consequence of that proposition. 
Contrast this plausible argument for theological fatalism with the fol-
lowing standard argument for logical fatalism: 
AN ARGUMENT FOR LOGICAL FATALISM 
LP1. It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD. 
LP2. Necessarily, if it was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb 
Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD then Plantinga will climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
LC1. So, Plantinga has no choice about climbing Mount Rushmore in 
2000 AD. 
The theological argument appears to be much stronger than the logical 
argument because there seems to be no plausibly valid inference rule 
that sanctions the inference from the premises to (LC1): notice that the 
"no choice" locution appears only in the conclusion of the logical argu-
ment while it figures in both a premise (TP1) and the conclusion of the 
theological argument. Moreover, as many have pointed out, replacing 
the first premise of the logical argument with 
LP1'. Plantinga has no choice about the fact that it was true in 50 AD 
that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
does not seem to help the logical fatalist. For while the modified argu-
ment is of the same plausibly valid logical form as the standard theologi-
cal fatalism argument, (LP1') seems far less plausible than the corre-
sponding premise, (TP1), of the theological argument. While (TP1) is 
intuitively supported by an appeal to the fixity of the past, (LP1') is not.9 
Though we grant that the standard theological argument has certain 
merits that the standard logical argument lacks, we think that it is a mis-
take to conclude from this that the theological problem is more difficult 
than the logical problem. The fact that one argument for theological 
fatalism appears stronger than one argument for logical fatalism certain-
ly does not show that theological fatalism is a more difficult problem 
than logical fatalism. To demonstrate this claim one must do more than 
simply demonstrate that one argument for logical fatalism appears 
weaker than a similar argument for theological fatalism. If one hopes to 
show that the theological problem is more difficult than the logical prob-
lem, one must show that the consistency of (1) and (2), the propositions 
the logical fatalist claims are incompatible, is compatible with the incon-
sistency of (1) and (3), the propositions the theological fatalist claims are 
incompatible. Pointing out that one argument for the incompatibility of 
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(1) and (3) is more plausible than a similar argument for the incompati-
bility of (1) and (2) simply does not support the position that the theo-
logical problem is more difficult than the logical problem. lO 
Our diagnosis of the disagreement over the relative strengths of logi-
cal and theological fatalism survives this examination of the standard 
arguments for each position. Our diagnosis also goes a long way 
towards explaining the ongoing controversy (especially among theisti-
cally inclined philosophers) over the relation between the two kinds of 
fatalism. It is not unusual to find widespread disagreement over an issue 
that depends for its resolution on the resolution of a particularly con-
tentious issue (the issue concerning the modal status of God's existence, 
or similarly, the issue concerning God's relation to the existence of free 
creatures). The fact that these issues concerning the modal status of 
God's existence bear on the fatalism controversy has, for the most part, 
gone unnoticed. l1 We claim that this at least partially explains the ongo-
ing controversy over the relation between the two kinds of fataJism. '2 
The University of Notre Dame 
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1. For one example among many see Richard Taylor, "Fatalism," The 
Philosopical Review 71,1962,56-66. 
2. See, for example, William Hasker, Cod, Time, and Knowledge, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1989 and Nelson Pike, "Divine Omniscience and 
Voluntary Action," The Philosophical Review 74, 27-46. Following the stan-
dard literature we take "God" to be a rigid designator and accept that God 
is omniscient in any possible world in which He exists. 
3. See William Lange Craig, The Only Wise God, Baker Book House, 
Grand Rapids, 1987, page 67, Richard Taylor, "Fatalism," page 57, and Alvin 
Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," Faith alld Philosophy 3, 235-269. Several 
philosophers (for example, William Craig and Linda Zagzebski) attribute 
this position to Susan Haack and cite Haack's "On a Theological Argument 
for Fatalism," The Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1974, 156-159, in which Haack at 
least seems to take this position (but see page 158). These philosophers 
apparently fail to notice Haack's further clarification of her position in "On 
'On Theological Fatalism Again' Again," The Philosophical Quarterly 25, 159-
161 (see especially page 161). 
4. Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1991, page 14. See also Hasker, God, Time, and 
Knowledge, pages 76-77, and Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary 
Action/' pages 70-71 in the version reprinted in John Martin Fischer's 
anthology God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom (Stanford University Press, 1989). 
Fischer also takes this position in the introduction to God, Foreknowledge, and 
Freedom. See also Pike's" A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge 
Problem/' International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33, 1993, 129-164 
(especially pages 136-140). 
5. Theistic philosophers accepting either of these metaphysical entail-
ments have a particularly strong response to the theological fatalist available 
to them. These philosophers can simply point to any refutation of logical 
fatalism (consistent with their metaphysical views) and point out that their 
238 Faith and Philosophy 
metaphysical views imply the equivalence of logical and theological fatal-
ism. See Ted A. Warfield, "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are 
Compatible," Nous 31, 1997, 80-86 for a developement of this response. 
6. Assuming that these philosophers hold a standard view of omni-
science, if any of them were to accept that God exists necessarily (or exists in 
any world in which free creatures exist), his or her overall position connect-
ing God's existence to the foreknowledge problem would be inconsistent. 
7. To give just three examples, Fischer (in "Introduction: God and 
Freedom" in Fischer's God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom), Zagzebski (in The 
Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge) and David Widerker (in "Two Forms 
of Fatalism" reprinted in Fischer's God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom) seem to 
reason in this way. 
8. We take John Martin Fischer's "Introduction: God and Freedom" in 
Fischer's God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom as a standard introduction to both 
problems and model our quick presentation of these arguments on the more 
detailed discussion and presentation on pages 3-14 of Fischer's helpful 
essay. 
9. Propositions expressing God's past beliefs (propositions like (TP1» 
are at least plausibly thought to be a part of the "hard" or fixed past while 
propositions expressing only the past truth of future tensed propositions are 
not as plausibly thought to be a part of the fixed past. See Fischer's God, 
Foreknowledge, and Freedom for many of the most important articles on the 
fixity of the past and the hard/ soft fact distinction. 
10. Notice, for example, that one committed to God's necessary existence 
is committed to God's knowing in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD in any world in which it is true that Plantinga will so 
climb. Such a philosopher is committed, then, to the logical equivalence of 
(TP1) and (LPl') This shows how such a philosopher committed to God's 
necessary existence could "convert" the weak looking standard argument 
for logical fatalism into an argument for that position that looks exactly as 
strong as the corresponding standard argument for theological fatalism. 
The general point here is a simple one. If a proposition expressing 
the inconsistency of (1) and (3) is strictly equivalent to a proposition express-
ing the inconsistency of (1) and (2) then (regardless of the intensions of the 
propositions in question) any argument for the conclusion that (1) and (3) 
are incompatible could, in one simple step, be "converted" into an argument 
for the incompatibility of (1) and (2). So the fact that one such argument 
might strike one as stronger than the other is irrelevant to the logic and 
metaphysics of the matter. 
11. Plantinga seems to be aware of this relevance (see "On Ockham's 
Way Out," pages 195-196 in the version in Fischer's God, Foreknowledge, and 
Freedom) and so does Warfield (see "Divine Foreknowledge and Human 
Freedom are Compatible," pages 81-82). But, most importantly, the philoso-
phers claiming that theological fatalism is a harder problem than logical 
fatalism do not seem to notice this relevance. 
12. We thank Tom Flint for helpful discussion and the Editor and refer-
ees of Faith and Philosophy for helpful comments. 
